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THE CHASE COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
A WATERSHED IN AMERICAN
CONS TITUTIONALISM
by Robert J. Kaczorowski*
Three weeks before he died in May 1873, the frail and ailing
Salmon P. Chase joined three of his brethern in dissent in one
of the most important cases ever decided by the United States
Supreme Court, the Slaughter-House Cases.1 This decision was a
watershed in United States constitutional history for several
reasons. Doctrinally, it represented a rejection of the virtually
unanimous decisions of the lower federal courts upholding the
constitutionality of revolutionary federal civil rights laws enacted
in the aftermath of the Civil War.2 Institutionally, it was an
example of extraordinary judicial activism in overriding the leg-
islative will of Congress.3 Politically, it abolished the constitu-
tional theory on which the Justice Department depended in its
enforcement of the fundamental rights of Americans in the South
during Reconstruction. The Court thus provided legal sanction
for the Grant administration's retreat in 1873 from its civil rights
enforcement efforts. The Court's decision annulled a revolution
in American constitutionalism.4
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.S.C., Loyola University,
Chicago (1960); M.A., DePaul University (1967); Ph.D., University of Minnesota (1971);
J.D., New York University (1982). For their helpful comments and suggestions, the author
wishes to thank his colleagues, Martin Flaherty, James Fleming, and William Treanor.
1. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Three cases were decided
together.
2. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION]. The conclusions stated in this paragraph are based primarily
on this work.
3. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986) [hereinafter Revolutionary Consti-
tutionalism]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship,
and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1987) [hereinafter To Begin
the Nation Anew]; Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866: A Legislative History in Light of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565 (1989)
[hereinafter Enforcement Provisions].
4. Scholars have come to refer to the Reconstruction Amendments as the "Second
American Revolution." See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991); DAVID A. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND
LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 141-45 (1991).
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I would like to tell you why I think these generalizations about
Slaughter-House are accurate. I will briefly discuss the legislative
background of the case, focusing on the history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 for what it tells us about the framers'
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. I will then discuss
the valiant efforts of federal lawyers and judges to enforce the
fundamental rights of Americans under these and other statutory
and constitutional provisions up to 1873. I will then discuss the
Chase Court's decisions. This will provide the context for, and,
hopefully, make more clear the significance of the Slaughter-
House Cases.
The Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship on all Ameri-
cans and protects their privileges and immunities and rights to
due process and equal protection of the law. In my view, the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to revolutionize
the constitutional structure of the nation in 1866 by making more
explicit the delegation of constitutional authority to secure the
status and fundamental rights of citizens they believed the Thir-
teenth Amendment conferred on Congress.' The framers defined
the freedom the Thirteenth Amendment secures as the status
and rights of free men, which they equated to the status and
rights of citizenship. 6 They believed that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment delegated to Congress constitutional authority to enforce
the fundamental rights of American citizens.7
In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 18668 in the same session
of Congress, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment inten-
tionally exercised plenary legislative authority under the Thir-
5. I develop this interpretation in the works cited supra note 3. See also sources
cited supra note 4, and ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 (1988); ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY
(1983); and HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1877, at 386-438 (1982).
6. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474, 476, 527-28, 573-74, 600, 1756, 1780-81
(1866) [hereinafter CONG. GLOBE] (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 602, 741 (Sen. Lane); id. at 1255
(Sen. Wilson); id. appendix at 101 (Sen. Yates); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1151 (Rep.
Thayer); id. at 1156-57 (Rep. Thornton); id. appendix at 158 (Rep. Delano): This was the
understanding of contemporaries outside of Congress. See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 899 n.156.
7. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 474, 605 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 503-04 (Sen. Howard);
id. at 570 (Sen. Morrill); id. at 602 (Sen. Lane); id. at 768 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 1118 (Rep.
Wilson); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook); id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1159 (Rep. Windom).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
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teenth Amendment to secure the civil rights of all Americans as
the fundamental rights of United States citizenship, not simply
the rights of African-Americans. Thus, Senator Lyman Trumbull
of Illinois, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and
author of the Civil Rights Act, explained that the rights of United
States citizenship that the bill was intended to secure "are those
inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens as free
men in all countries .... " "[C]itizens of the United States, as
such, are entitled to possess and enjoy the great fundamental
civil rights which it is the true office of Government to protect,"
declared Congressman James Wilson of Iowa, House floor man-
ager of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.10 Relying on Chief Justice
John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, Wilson contin-
ued, "possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary
implication the [plenary] power in Congress to protect them.""
From this perspective, section one of the Fourteenth Amendment
can be understood as making more explicit the Thirteenth
Amendment's delegation of plenary authority to secure citizens'
rights. 12
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus conferred citizenship on all
Americans. It also conferred on all United States citizens certain
fundamental rights specified in section one. In other words, the
citizen possessed these rights independent of state law. Thus,
Senator Trumbull declared:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights;
and what are they? They are those inherent, fundamental rights
which belong to free citizens or free men in all countries, such as
the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them in all
the States of the Union.13
He emphasized the point when he admonished "that the federal
government has authority to make every inhabitant of [any state]
a citizen, and clothe him with the authority to inherit and buy
real estate, and the [states] cannot help it."14 Congressman Lawr-
9. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1757.
10. Id. at 1118.
11. Id. at 1119. Regarding the framers' intention to secure the rights of all Americans,
see Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 895-99.
12. I have developed this argument in the articles cited supra note 3.
13. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1757 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 500.
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ence made the same point in the House: "There are certain
absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent,
and of which a State cannot constitutionally deprive him."'15
However, the statute contemplated concurrent state jurisdic-
tion over, and the continuation of the states' essential role in
securing these rights.16 The framers' desire to preserve concur-
rent state jurisdiction over civil rights led to confusion among
some twentieth-century scholars over the essential scope and
nature of the statute. Section one guarantees that all United
States citizens shall enjoy the enumerated rights and immunities
as white citizens enjoyed them. It thus prohibited the states
from discriminating on the basis of race or politics in regulating
the exercise of these rights. 7 The framers intended the states
to retain the authority they had previously exercised in regulat-
ing the enjoyment and the exercise of civil rights in other
respects. Section one of the Civil Rights Act thus conferred
citizenship and some of the rights of United States citizenship in
a way that permitted the states concurrent authority to regulate
in a racially and politically impartial manner the exercise of these
rights. Even the most radical Republicans never intended to
abolish the states. Nor did any Republicans wish to supplant the
states in administering ordinary civil and criminal justice. They
merely sought to supplant the state with the federal administra-
tion of justice in those situations when citizens were unable to
enforce their rights or redress rights violations within state and
local legal process. 8 The framers envisioned a federal system of
civil rights enforcement in which the states would exercise their
traditional jurisdiction over ordinary civil and criminal process,
and but that citizens would turn to federal legal process when
they were unable to enforce their rights within the states.
The reasons that explain why the framers retained concurrent
state jurisdiction over national rights reveals their commitment
to dual sovereignty, albeit a radically changed version, and the
15. Id. at 1833.
16. Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 572-73.
17. The framers intended to protect white Unionists, Republicans, and federal officers
in the South from civil rights violations attributable to political animus owing to their
loyalty to the Union and to the causes of the Republican party. See, Kaczorowski,
Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 589 n.115; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Consti-
tutionalism, supra note 3, at 897 n.153.
18. Id. and Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 3, at 56-57.
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limits of their commitment to equal rights. If the Civil Rights
Act had made a blanket grant of the specified rights to all
citizens, the grant would have voided state laws regulating the
manner in which they were enjoyed and exercised. State regu-
lations based on sex, marital status, age, and mental disability,
which the framers considered reasonable and legitimate discrim-
inations, would have been abolished if the statute had conferred
the right unconditionally. 19 The framers wanted to avoid this
result. They succeeded in retaining concurrent state authority
over civil rights by providing that all citizens shall have the
same enumerated rights "as [are] enjoyed by white citizens.."20
Nevertheless, the Civil Rights Act also provided for the en-
forcement of civil rights directly in the federal courts. Because
they understood that Congress could enforce federal rights only
through the federal courts and other national institutions, the
framers provided an alternative system of civil and criminal
justice to those of the states when individuals could not enforce
or were denied their civil rights in the state courts. 21 Conferring
jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce fundamental rights
was required not only by nineteenth-century legal theories of
constitutional law and federalism, it was dictated by the fact that
the states were failing to secure these rights and were actually
infringing them. Thus, after asserting that civil rights were
federally secured rights of United States citizens, Congressman
Wilson proclaimed: "The possession of the rights by the citizen
raises by implication the power in Congress to provide appro-
priate means for their protection; in other words, to supply the
needed remedy." 22 If a citizen was unable to enforce his rights
through a state's legal process, he queried,
[H]ave we no power to make him secure in his priceless posses-
sions? When such a case is presented can we not provide a remedy?
Who will doubt it? Must we wait for the perpetration of the wrong
before acting? Who will affirm this? The power is with us to
provide the necessary protective remedies.23
19. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1835-36 (Rep. Lawrence); Kaczorowski,
Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 573.
20. Id. at n.38.
21. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1294 (Sen. Wilson) (quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-16 (1842)). See Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note
3, at 568-69, 581-82 for a fuller discussion of these points.
22. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1294.
23. Id.
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If Congress could not provide the remedies, Wilson wanted to
know, then "from whom shall they come? From the source inter-
fering with the right? Not at all. They must be provided by the
government of the United States, whose duty is to protect the
citizen in return for the allegiance he owes to the Government.."24
Moreover, the framers expressly stated their intention to by-
pass state law enforcement institutions by enforcing citizens'
fundamental rights and providing remedies for civil rights viol-
ations in and through the federal courts whenever citizens could
not enforce their civil rights in the state courts or through state
legal process. 25 This intention could not have been stated more
clearly than it was by Congressman Thayer when he said that
the Civil Rights Act provided for the enforcement of citizens'
fundamental rights
through the quiet, dignified, firm, and constitutional forms of
judicial procedure. The bill seeks to enforce these rights in the
same manner and with the same sanctions under and by which
other laws of the United States are enforced. It imposes duties
upon the judicial tribunals of the country which require the en-
forcement of these rights. It provides for the administration of
laws for the enforcement of these rights. 26
Further evidence of this point is the fact that many of the
enforcement provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
taken from the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, a statute enacted by
Congress to provide for the rendition of fugitive slaves through
national institutions, including the federal courts, after the Su-
preme Court had decided that Congress did not have the au-
thority to require state officers and state courts to enforce federal
rights and duties, but that it could enforce them only through
federal courts and only with federal officers. 27 Thus, opponents
of the Civil Rights Bill strenuously objected that this statute
would transfer all civil suits to the federal courts. "Every little
petty case of a civil character in which from ten cents to thou-
sands of dollars are involved" would be absorbed by the federal
24. Id. at 1118.
25. See, e.g., id. at 1118, 1294.
26. Id. at 1153. See also id. at 479 (Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 598-99 (Sen. Davis); id. at
601 (Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1271 (Rep. Kerr), id. at (Cong. Bingham).
27. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9
Stat. 462 (1850).
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courts, complained Senator Saulsbury.28 Opponents similarly
warned that the states' whole criminal codes would be taken
over and administered by the federal courts.2
The Civil Rights Act, therefore, established a federal system
of civil and criminal justice that supplanted those of the states
whenever Americans could not enforce or were denied their civil
rights in state courts. The framers authorized federal courts to
replace state courts, and to try civil and criminal cases that were
otherwise within the jurisdiction of the state courts, whenever
individuals could not enforce their rights in or were denied their
rights by state courts and legal process. Such persons could bring
their causes into federal court either by originating the action in
the federal court or by removal from a state court.3 0
Although the enforcement of civil rights under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 in the federal courts during the administration of
President Andrew Johnson was relatively quiescent, two cases,
one civil and the other criminal, demonstrate the extraordinary
expansion of federal jurisdiction over citizens' rights intended by
its framers. The first case was decided by the Chief Justice whom
we honor today while he sat as circuit justice in the United
States Circuit Court at Baltimore, Maryland. The case, In re
Turner3 1 involved a private apprenticeship indenture between a
black girl and her former master. The suit challenged the legality
of the indenture under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the grounds
that it did not afford the girl the financial and educational benefits
to which white apprentices were entitled under the Maryland
indenture statute. Chief Justice Chase upheld the constitution-
ality of the Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth Amendment
which, he declared, "establishes freedom as the constitutional
right of all persons in the United States."32 He ruled that the
indenture contract was void under the Civil Rights Act because
it failed, as required in section one, to give the black girl the
28. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 479. See also id. at 598-99 (Sen. Davis).
29. Id. at 479 (Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 601 (Sen. Hendricks); id. at 1271 (Rep. Kerr).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1866, S 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRE-
TATION, supra note 2, at 27-48; Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 586-
88.
31. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
32. Id. at 339.
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"'full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens."'3 3
Chief Justice Chase's decision in Turner is significant for
several reasons. First, it demonstrates the potential reach of the
federal courts into the state administration of civil justice. Chase
affirmed federal jurisdiction in a case that was essentially a
contract dispute between two private parties.3 4
The Turner decision is also important for the insight it offers
into contemporaries' understanding of the right to the equal
protection of the law. The provision of the Civil Rights Act that
conferred jurisdiction on the federal court to decide this contract
dispute was that clause of section one that guarantees citizens
the equal protection of the laws for the security of persons and
property. The party who violated Turner's equal protection right
in this case was not the state, but Turner's former master, a
private party.35 The instrument that violated Turner's right was
not a state statute, but the private apprenticeship contract. Thus,
the right to the equal protection of the law, a right which today
we understand exclusively as a right one has against the gov-
ernment to be treated in the same manner as similarly situated
people, was also understood by nineteenth-century Americans as
a private right one possessed in relation to other private indi-
viduals.
More broadly, this case offers an interesting insight into Amer-
icans' understanding of constitutional rights enforcement in the
nineteenth century. They conceived of constitutional rights es-
sentially as private rights that individuals enjoyed against other
private individuals, which they enforced through private litigation
33. Id.
34. This application of federal jurisdiction is parallel to that invoked by freedmen's
bureau agents who tried to enforce labor contracts between black field hands and white
landholders who refused to honor the terms of their agreements. If black workers were
unable to enforce their contract rights in the local courts, they were permitted to bring
their actions into the federal courts by the explicit provisions of section three of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. See, Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 580-
81 for a discussion of the relationship between the military's and freedmen's bureau's
enforcement of individual rights and the enforcement provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. The Turner decision, therefore, legitimized the legal actions federal officers
undertook to enforce the freedmen's private and civil rights.
35. Private parties were also criminally prosecuted under the Enforcement Act of
1870 for violating individuals' rights to equal protection of the law. See supra notes 21,
22 and related text.
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against defendants who were private parties rather than public
officers.3 6 The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment legislated
within a legal framework that barred the kind of legal action
against state officials to remove legal disabilities unconstitution-
ally imposed by state law that we, today, have come to regard
as commonplace. The framers, guided by nineteenth-century rules
of dual federalism, state sovereign immunity, and equitable relief,
would not have thought in terms of civil suits against a state to
enjoin the enforcement of discriminatory state action as a remedy
for the enforcement of constitutionally-secured rights.
Moreover, the notion of public rights enforced through public
lawsuits brought against governmental agencies and officials on
behalf of aggrieved groups did not exist in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The model of rights-enforcement that the framers had in
mind was a civil suit between private parties, not an action by
an aggrieved individual or class against the state.37 It is not
surprising, therefore, that suits against state officers for injunc-
tive relief were relatively rare until the end of the nineteenth
century. Injunctive relief against state officials was given very
scant attention in nineteenth-century legal treatises on injunc-
tions and the law of equity, usually no more than a paragraph
with citations to only a few cases.3 Moreover, treatise writers
appeared unfamiliar with the rules regarding civil actions against
state officials, for they reported them in an imprecise manner.
It was not until the 1890s that treatises gave more than passing
attention to the subject. 39
Consequently, even an individual whose civil rights were alleg-
edly infringed by a state officer acting under color of law would
sue the state officer as a private party; he would not sue the
state. Thus, the butchers sued the state-chartered corporation
36. This point is developed in Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at
574-86.
37. See Kaczorowski, Enforcement Provisions, supra note 3, at 574-86 for a more
detailed discussion. See also supra text accompanying note 26.
38. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS
IN EQUITY 3, 599-600 (1871); 1 ABBOT'S UNITED STATES PRACTICE 222-23 (1871); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 163 (6th ed. 1873) and id. at 180 n.4, 260
(13th ed. 1886); and THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 118-19 (1880).
39. CHARLES F. BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 1402-18 (1895);
2 SHIRLEY T. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 1321-45 (1905).
160 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:151
rather than the state in the Slaughter-House Cases.40 The impor-
tant point is that the judicial creation of the state action doctrine
in the 1870s limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in
a manner unanticipated by its framers. 41
The other noteworthy civil rights case was a criminal prose-
cution brought right here in Kentucky. The federal legal officers
in Kentucky presented a striking exception to the lethargy that
characterized federal officers elsewhere during the Johnson ad-
ministration. The United States Attorney at Louisville, Benjamin
Helm Bristow, assisted by another Louisville attorney by the
name of John Marshall Harlan, conscientiously prosecuted crimes
in federal court under section three of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 that were offenses against the criminal statutes of Kentucky.
Bristow brought prosecutions directly into federal court without
even testing the state courts because black Kentuckians were
barred by state law from testifying in civil and criminal cases in
which a white person was a party.42
The most detailed federal judicial examination of the consti-
tutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was made in 1867 by
Justice Noah H. Swayne, as circuit justice, in a prosecution
brought by Bristow against three whites charged with robbing
the home of a black family in Nelson County." In this case,
United States v. Rhodes," Justice Swayne upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in an opinion in which
he affirmed the congressional Republicans' interpretation of the
40. For other examples of private lawsuits to enforce fundamental rights, see In re
Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (suit by apprentice against master
for release from apprenticeship contract that violated her right to the equal protection
of the laws); United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882) (civil suit and
prosecution of public school teacher for excluding black child from public school). See also
COOLEY, supra note 38, at 118 (although state may not be sued, state-chartered corporation
may be sued even when state is primary stockholder).
41. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a more favorable assessment
of the Supreme Court during this period, see Michael L. Benedict, Laissez-Faire and
Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Contructionalism,
3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985); Michael L. Benedict, Reserving Federalism: Reconstruction
and the Waite Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV. 39 (1978).
42. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 52.
43. Id. at 9.
44. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
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Thirteenth Amendment as securing to all Americans the status
and fundamental rights of citizenship and as conferring on Con-
gress plenary authority to enforce civil rights. Justice Swayne
interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as conferring upon all
Americans, not just the former slaves, the status and rights of
citizenship. He reasoned to this conclusion under the same rea-
soning as the framers of the Civil Rights Act. The amendment
secured to all Americans the status and rights of free inhabitants,
which he equated to the status and rights of citizenship. 45 Con-
sequently, in abolishing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment se-
cured to all Americans the status and rights of citizenship.
Therefore, "the provision in the act of Congress conferring citi-
zenship was unnecessary, and is inoperative," he concluded. 4 In
interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment as a constitutional guar-
antee of the status and natural rights of citizenship, Swayne had
"no doubt of the constitutionality of the act in all its provisions,"
since it was enacted to implement the Amendment's guarantee
of liberty.47
Every federal judge who was presented with a challenge to
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 upheld it. 4s
Most state appellate courts upheld its constitutionality as well
under the theory of citizenship affirmed by its framers.49 Even
states rights-oriented judges acknowledged the revolutionary con-
stitutional theory reflected in the statute in refusing to accept
its legitimacy.50
This excursion into the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
is intended to give a fuller understanding of the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of the Chase Court's initial inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House
Cases. Congress enacted additional civil rights enforcement sta-
tutes after the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
45. Id. at 789.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 794.
48. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 1-12; Kaczorowski, Rev-
olutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 902-03; Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation
Anew, supra note 3, at 56-62.
49. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 5-7; Kaczorowski, Revo-
lutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 903.
50. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 5-7; Kaczorowski, Revo-
lutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 907-909.
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Amendments, which are also part of the background. These
statutes provided for the enforcement of fundamental rights
directly in the federal courts.
Two are of particular interest here. The Enforcement Act of
May 31, 1870 was primarily directed at protecting citizens' rights
to vote in local, state, and federal elections.51 The second statute
was the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871.52 This statute was
intended to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore
focused on protecting the fundamental rights of citizens, other
than political rights, including their right to the equal protection
of the law. It defined as federal crimes terrorist activities, such
as those in which the Klan was engaged to prevent citizens from
exercising their fundamental rights.5
Even more than the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Enforcement
Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 enormously
expanded federal criminal jurisdiction over the enforcement of
51. Enforcement Act of 1870, 114 Stat. 141 (1870). It also criminalized election fraud
and bribery. In addition, the 1870 statute made it a federal crime to prevent citizens
from voting and from exercising their other constitutionally secured rights through the
use of violence, "bribery, threats, or threats of depriving such person of employment or
occupation, or of ejecting such person from rented house, lands, or other property, or by
threats of refusing to renew leases or contracts of labor." Id. at S 5. Finally, it criminalized
actions that injured, oppressed, threatened, or intimidated "any citizen with intent to
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having
exercised the same." Id. at S 6. Criminal penalties ranged from fines of from $500 to
$5,000 and imprisonment of from one month to ten years, depending upon the crime. The
1870 statute re-enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, presumably to ensure its constitu-
tionality after the recent ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
52. Ku Klux Klan Act, 22 Stat. 13 (1871).
53. For example, it provided that any person "shall be deemed guilty of a high crime"
who was convicted for engaging in conspiracies to commit, and for actually committing,
the following actions: for resisting federal authority and the execution of any federal law;
for injuring federal legal officers to prevent them from performing their federal duties;
for threatening or injuring federal jurors on account of any presentment, indictment, or
verdict; for depriving or conspiring to deprive any person or any class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities; for preventing the
authorities of any state from securing to all persons within the state the equal protection
of the laws; for defeating the due course of justice within the state; and for preventing
any voter from expressing his support for any candidate for federal office. 22 Stat. 13, S
2. It also conferred a civil cause of action in law and equity against "any person who,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,"
shall deprive "any person" of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States." 22 Stat. 13, S 1 (codified in 42 U.S.C. S 1983). It also
empowered the President to declare martial law and to suspend habeas corpus under
certain conditions. 22 Stat. 14-15, S 3-4.
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citizens' fundamental rights. These statutes were enacted to meet
the increasingly virulent Southern resistance to Reconstruction
as Republicans captured control of Southern state governments
after 1867.5 White supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan
emerged as paramilitary wings of the Democratic Conservative
parties of the South. Their political purposes were to unseat
Republican officeholders, to return political power and offices to
white supremacists, and to disenfranchise Southern blacks.
The paramilitary structure of the Ku Klux Klan and other
terrorist groups enabled them to intimidate black and white
Republicans. With membership rolls numbering in the thousands
in some counties, the Klan paralyzed local government. In York
County, South Carolina, for example, some 1,500 to 2,000 suspects
were said to have escaped military arrest in 1872, even though
federal authorities had succeeded in arresting hundreds of oth-
ers.55 The administration of criminal justice collapsed in sections
of the South, their populations victimized by bands of criminals
who brutalized them with impunity. In short, these groups were
in armed rebellion against the United States.
The Grant administration initially threw its full support behind
the vigorous prosecution of Klansmen under the 1870 and 1871
statutes.57 Literally hundreds of defendants were prosecuted and
convicted of violating citizens' fundamental rights, such as the
First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of assem-
bly, the Second Amendment right to bear arms, the Fourteenth
Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws, and the
right to life itself. Federal judges generally upheld the constitu-
tionality of the 1870 and 1871 statutes and federal jurisdiction in
these cases." That even disapproving judges upheld these sta-
tutes evinces how broadly contemporaries interpreted the Recon-
54. This terrorism is documented in JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDITION OF
AFFAIRS IN THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. REP. No. 22
and S. REP. No. 41 (13 vols.). The best history of the Ku Klux Klan during Reconstruction
is ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN
RECONSTRUCTION (1971).
55. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 55.
56. Id.; OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION (1963).
57. The history of the efforts of the Department of Justice to enforce civil rights
during Reconstruction is recounted in KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
2, at 49-134.
58. Id. at 72.
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struction amendments and Congress' authority to enforce citizens'
fundamental rights.
In many areas of the South, the federal administration of
criminal justice was the only justice available. Even though the
magnitude of the lawlessness was so great that it overwhelmed
the limited resources of federal legal officers, they were remark-
ably successful in bringing criminals to justice. 59 Indeed, federal
legal process succeeded in destroying the Ku Klux Klan and
almost eliminated terrorism in the early 1870s, at least tempo-
rarily.6 Peace depended upon the continued vigorous prosecution
of terrorists.61 Despite the pleadings of federal lawyers in the
South, the Grant administration began to curtail prosecutions
toward the end of 1872. By the summer of 1873, the Justice
Department abandoned efforts to enforce civil rights in the South
in the hope that clemency and appeasement would preserve the
peace. 62 President Grant's decision also reflected growing senti-
ment in the North that called for the federal government to stop
interferring in Southern affairs and to make peace with the
South.6 3
It was just as Northern opinion was becoming unfavorable to
federal civil rights enforcement and the Grant administration was
curtailing its efforts to enforce citizens' civil and political rights
that the Chase Court interpreted the scope of the national gov-
ernment's authority to enforce citizens' fundamental rights under
the Reconstruction amendments and civil rights statutes.64 The
first case it decided, Blyew and Kennard v. United States,6 5 arose
here in Kentucky and tested the constitutionality of federal
criminal prosecutions under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
petitioners were two white men who had been tried and convicted
in the United States District Court at Louisville for the mutilation
59. Id. at 87-113.
60. Id. at 93-94.
61. Id. at 94-95.
62. Id. at 108-12.
63. Id. at 112-13. The best history of the Grant administration's Southern policy is
WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879 (1979).
64. Letter from Amos Ackerman to B. Conley (Dec. 28, 1871), 1 LETTERBOOKS 272-77,
AMOS T. ACKERMAN PAPERS, Alderman Library, University of Virginia.
65. Blyew and Kennard v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872). For a further
discussion of this case, see KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 135-
41. The most thorough analysis of the Blyew case is Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations
on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1989).
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and ax murder of a black woman in Lewis County. Judge Bland
Ballard sentenced them to death.66 It is noteworthy that this case
had been removed from the state courts by United States mar-
shalls while the defendants were in state custody awaiting trial.
Defense counsel challenged the federal court's jurisdiction,
arguing that the crime for which his clients had been tried, the
crime of murder, was an offense against the laws of Kentucky,
not those of the United States.67 He insisted, therefore, that the
federal prosecution of offenses against the state's criminal code
was an unconstitutional usurpation of the state's exclusive juris-
diction over its system of criminal justice.
Judge Ballard turned back the challenge and upheld federal
jurisdiction. His reasoning affirmed the congressional Republican
theory of the Thirteenth Amendment and citizenship which Justice
Swayne had earlier adopted in the Rhodes case. Acknowledging
that Congress had not enacted a criminal code which made
offenses such as murder federal crimes, Ballard nonetheless con-
cluded that Congress could authorize the federal courts to try
and punish violations of civil rights, such as the right to life,
according to the laws of the states in which the violations oc-
curred.
Alarmed by what it saw as a revolutionary centralization of
judicial power, the Kentucky legislature, on the recommendation
of the governor, appropriated funds to hire the best available
lawyers to challenge the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 to the Supreme Court. The attorneys it chose included
one of the foremost lawyers of the day, President James Buch-
anan's attorney general, Jeremiah S. Black, and the locally prom-
inent Isaac Caldwell.6 9
66. Letter from Judge R. H. Stanton to J. S. Black (Nov. 23, 1870), JEREMIAH S. BLACK
PAPERS, Columbia University, microfilm collection, vol. 52, reel 26; letter from Benjamin
H. Bristow to E. Rockwood Hoar (Apr. 22, 1869), Source Chronological File, Letters
Received by the U.S. Attorney General, National Archives. The proceedings in the lower
federal court are in Briefs for Appellee, Blyew and Kennard v. United States, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 581 (1871).
67. The lower court decision is not reported. The proceedings were recorded in the
LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 29, 1868, at 4; MAYSVILLE BULLETIN, n.d., reprinted in
LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Dec. 19, 1868, at 1. See, KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRE-
TATION, supra note 2, at 136.
68. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 136.
69. Id. at 137.
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In their arguments to the Chase Court in February 1871, Black
and Caldwell urged the Court to strike down the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. They insisted that the statute was unconstitutional
because it attempted to secure civil rights by conferring primary
criminal jurisdiction on the federal courts to try offenses against
the criminal statutes of the state. Thus elaborating the arguments
that had been made in the court below, they insisted that, if
Congress had the constitutional authority to enact this statute,
then it had the authority to supplant the states in any matter
"touching civil and political rights.."70
Defense counsel also made a technical argument from the
statute's language in section three that became the basis of the
Court's decision. Section three confers jurisdiction on the federal
courts "over all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who
are denied or cannot enforce in the courts ... the rights secured
to them by the first section of this act." Black and Caldwell
argued that the only parties affected by a criminal prosecution
are the government and the defendant. Therefore, the Civil
Rights Act did not confer jurisdiction over this and similar cases
even where the black victim of, and the black witnesses to, a
crime were denied the right to testify in a state court, a right
secured by section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, because
they were not parties to the criminal "cause". This point was
supported by United States v. Ortega,71 which held that a criminal
prosecution was a "case" that affected only the government and
the defendant.
This argument was first raised in United States v. Rhodes.7 2
Justice Swayne rejected this reading of section three by distin-
guishing the language in the statute, "cause", from the language
used in Ortega, "case", and holding that Ortega did not apply to
the Civil Rights Act which refers to "the origin or foundation of
a thing, as of a suit or action; a ground of action," not to a
specific case itself.73 Swayne concluded that the victims of a crime
are parties affected by the prosecution of the perpetrators within
70. Brief for Appellants at 9, Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581. Defense counsel argued
that the Thirteenth Amendment did not delegate any civil rights enforcement authority
to Congress, for it merely abolished slavery.
71. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826).
72. 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151).
73. Id. at 786-87.
1993] CHASE COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 167
the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Therefore, the
federal court had jurisdiction to try white defendants for crimes
committed against black victims. 74 As we shall see, the Supreme
Court took a different view.
In a remarkable coincidence, the government's advocate was
none other than the former United States Attorney at Louisville,
Benjamin Helm Bristow. He had been appointed to the position
of solicitor general while the Blyew case was pending before the
Supreme Court. Bristow contended that the states could no longer
claim exclusive jurisdiction over violations of their criminal codes,
for, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "Congress made
the common law and state statutes the law of the United States"
in those civil and criminal causes in which citizens were unable
to enforce their rights in the state courts.75 If Congress possessed
the constitutional authority to confer on the federal courts con-
current jurisdiction over civil and criminal causes on the theory
that fundamental rights were constitutionally secured rights of
American citizens, as Bristow argued, then Congress did indeed
possess the authority, "to be exercised at will," to supplant the
states in all matters relating to civil and criminal matters as
Black and Caldwell argued.
Opposing counsel had presented for the first time to the United
States Supreme Court the central questions of constitutional
interpretation relating to citizenship and federal jurisdiction over
citizens' fundamental rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
The Chase Court deliberated for more than one year. Unfortu-
nately, the Chief Justice was too ill to participate in the oral
arguments and in the Court's deliberations.76
The Court announced its decision on April 1, 1872. It avoided
resolving the difficult questions relating to the national govern-
74. See, KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 11-13.
75. Brief for Appellee at 24, Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581.
76. FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN POLITICS 313 (1987). In 1869,
Chase was impeded with a "general nervous disorder" and irregular heartbeat. Id. In the
summer of 1870, Chase suffered a serious stroke that left him paralyzed on his right side
and with a partial speech loss. He suffered two additional minor strokes in the fall of
1870. Although Chase's health improved, Professor Blue reports that in the spring of
1871, "[f]riends found him frail and aging, and a few even failed to recognize him." Id. at
315. He was convalescing under the care of his daughter in Narragansett, Rhode Island
when the Blyew case was argued in 1871. Id. at 313-15. Although he resumed his duties
on the Court in the fall of 1871, he did not participate in the Court's Blyew decision. Id.
at 318.
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ment's constitutional authority to enforce the fundamental rights
of its citizens. The Court decided the case instead on a technical
interpretation of the statute's language regarding jurisdiction in
section three, which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts of
all "causes, civil and criminal" "affecting persons who are denied,
or cannot enforce in the [state] courts ... any of the rights
secured to them by the first section of the act." 7 The district
court and the Department of Justice claimed jurisdiction on the
ground that black victims and witnesses of crimes committed by
white assailants were denied their right to testify by the laws
of Kentucky, a right secured to them by the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
The Court rejected the government's and the lower federal
court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act on this jurisdictional
point. It instead adopted that of defense counsel. The Court held
that the statute did not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to
try criminal prosecutions of white defendants for crimes against
black victims in which the testimony of black witnesses was
inadmissible under state law. The Court reasoned that the only
parties affected by a criminal cause are the government and the
defendant. Consequently, "witnesses in a criminal prosecution are
not persons affected by the cause. 78 If federal jurisdiction could
be asserted merely by claiming that potential witnesses and even
victims of crimes were prevented from giving evidence because
of their race or color, the Court reasoned, "there is no cause
either civil or criminal of which those courts may not at the
option of either party take jurisdiction.."79 Federal courts could
try any case, civil or criminal, even those involving only white
parties, "whenever it was alleged that a citizen of the African
race was or might be an important witness.180 The Court refused
to believe that Congress had intended such a result. It sharply
curtailed federal criminal jurisdiction, holding that section three
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts only in those criminal
cases involving black defendants who were "denied in the State
courts any of the rights mentioned and assured to them in the
first section of the act.""'
77. Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 590-91.
78. Id. at 595.
79. Id. at 592.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 581, 592-93.
19931 CHASE COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 169
The majority evoked a stinging dissent from Justice Joseph P.
Bradley. 2 He was joined by Justice Noah H. Swayne, who had
earlier adopted the government's interpretation of federal juris-
diction sitting as circuit justice in the Rhodes case. Bradley chided
the majority for subjecting black Americans to "wanton insults
and fiendish assaults" that would render "their lives, their fam-
ilies, and their property unprotected by law."' ' He warned that
the Court's decision would invite "vindictive outlaws and felons
to rush upon these helpless people and kill and slay them at will,
as was done in this case. ' 8 4 As circuit justice for states of the
Deep South, Bradley had direct experience with these conditions
and knew what he was talking about. The Court's decision very
well could have had this effect because it eliminated the only
criminal justice blacks in states like Kentucky could expect to
receive.85
The federal district court judge whose ruling the Supreme
Court reversed, Judge Bland Ballard, also reacted bitterly.
"Blessed are they who expect little for they shall not be disap-
pointed," he wrote sarcastically to Solicitor General Bristow. "[If
Congress meant what the Court say they meant is not all of
their legislation which relates to the negro a mockery?" he
queried. Referring to other enforcement provisions of the 1866
statute, Judge Ballard hypothesized:
Think of the President using the army & navy not to capture the
desperado who has committed numberless outrages on the negro
& who sleeps secure under State laws, but to arrest the poor
82. Bradley admonished the majority for adopting A "view of the [Civil Rights Act of
1866] too narrow, too technical, and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had ifi view."
Id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Those liberal objectives were to give the federal courts
jurisdiction and to provide a remedy whenever "the State refuses to give one, where the
mischief consists in inaction or refusal to act, or refusal to give requisite relief." Id. at
597. Thus, he insisted that, "if the State should refuse to allow a freedman to sue in its
courts, thereby denying him judicial relief, or should fail to provide laws for the
punishment of white persons guilty of criminal acts against his person or property,
thereby denying him judicial redress, there can be no doubt that the case would come
within the scope of the [Civil Rights Act]." Id. Such causes affect not only the specific
victims of such crimes, but the whole class of persons to whom she belongs, he insisted.
Id. at 598.
83. Id. at 599.
84. Id.
85. Letter from G. C. Wharton to Judge H. H. Emmons (Apr. 9, 1872), HALMER H.
EMMONS PAPERS, Burton Historical Collection (box 1, folder 6), Detroit Public Library;
KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 142.
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negro & drag him before the United States to be there tried &
punished with high ceremony!!! 86
Not only did the Court's ruling in Blyew eliminate the govern-
ment's authority to prosecute whites who committed crimes
against blacks, it prompted the government to release previously
convicted defendants from prison.8 7
Notwithstanding the devastating impact of the Court's decision
on the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts, Black and
Caldwell failed in their central mission: to persuade the Chase
Court to declare the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Court concluded that the statute was intended to
give black Americans remedies in the federal courts in cases in
which they could not enforce their "personal, relative, or property
rights" in the courts of the states. In addition, because the Court
upheld federal jurisdiction in criminal cases in which black de-
fendants could not enforce their rights in the state courts, its
decision could be interpreted as having affirmed the government's
broader and more significant argument regarding congressional
authority to enforce personal rights by incorporating state com-
mon and statutory law into the Civil Rights Act of 1866.88 Thus,
John Marshall Harlan speculated that Black and Caldwell would
receive lower fees than they expected, because "the Democracy
are [not] at all jubilant over the result."8' 9
In April 1872, the Supreme Court managed to avoid deciding
the most politically explosive issues of American constitutional-
ism since the Civil War. A few weeks earlier it had dismissed
on narrow procedural grounds a case that Attorney General Amos
T. Akerman and United States Attorney for South Carolina,
Daniel T. Corbin, had agreed with defense counsel to send to the
Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of the government's
86. Letter from Judge Ballard to B. H. Bristow (Apr. 3, 1872), BENJAMIN H. BRISTOW
PAPERS (container 2) [hereinafter BRISTOW PAPERS], Library of Congress [hereinafter LC].
87. Solicitor General Bristow ordered their release to avoid civil suits against federal
legal officers for false imprisonment. All of the criminal defendants who had been
convicted in the federal court at Louisville under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were
released and their sentences were set aside. Letter from G. C. Wharton to B. H. Bristow
(Apr. 19, 1872), BRISTOW PAPERS, LC; KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
2, at 142.
88. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supr c note 2, at 141.
89. Letter from J. M. Harlan to B. H. Bristow (Apr. 15, 1872), BRISTOW PAPERS, LC
(container 2).
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criminal prosecutions of the Klan under the Enforcment Act of
1870Y0 This case came out of South Carolina, the state in which
Ku Klux Klan terrorism was the most virulent and the most
pervasive in 1871. The Klan actually controlled several counties
in the northwestern portion of the state9 1 South Carolina Dem-
ocratic Conservatives established a public fund to defend the
Klan and to challenge the constitutionality of the Justice De-
partment's efforts to enforce and protect citizens' civil and polit-
ical rights.9 2 They retained as defense counsel two of the most
eminent lawyers of the day, Henry Stanbery, who had served as
United States attorney general under President Andrew Johnson,
and Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, who was reputed to
be the Senate's leading constitutional lawyer.93 The government's
case was argued by the recently-appointed attorney general,
George H. Williams, and he was assisted by Assistant Attorney
General C. H. Hill.
The facts in the test case are clear and simple. The white
defendants, acting out of racial and political animus, had raided
the house of a black leader, robbed him of his weapons, and
lynched him.9 4 The lead defendant was James William Avery.
Avery was Grand Cyclops of the Ku Klux Klan in York County,
South Carolina, and a prosperous merchant there.9 5 The case,
United States v. Avery, presented a similar issue under the 1870
90. United- States v. Avery, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 251 (1872); PROCEEDINGS IN THE Ku
KLUX TRIALS, AT COLUMBIA, S.C. IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, NOVEMBER TERM,
1871, at 111, 139-45 (1872).
91. The local authorities were completely overwhelmed and unable to maintain law
and order. The United States attorney in South Carolina reported to the attorney general
that not a single successful prosecution of Ku Klux Klan outrages was brought under
state law in the state courts. Letter from D. T. Corbin to G. Williams (Feb. 20, 1872),
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAPERS, Series 947, Record Group 60, National Archives [hereinafter
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAPERS]. South Carolina was the only state in which President
Grant was forced to suspend the writ of habeas corpus under the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871. The United States attorney in South Carolina brought more prosecutions than
federal attorneys in any other state. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
2, at 88-91. He indicted literally hundreds of defendants in 1871.
92. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 88, 124.
93. According to the Lawyer's Edition, the defense team of Stanbery and Johnson
was joined by a third lawyer, David Dudley Field, who was as experienced and as eminent
as they. Field, of course, was also the brother of one of the justices before whom they
argued the case, Justice Stephen J. Field. However, the official reporter identifies only
Stanbery and Johnson as the defendant's attorneys.
94. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 122.
95. Id. at 129.
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statute that was raised in Blyew under the 1866 statute: whether
the federal court had jurisdiction to try the defendants for
murder in order to determine the punishment that should be
applied for their violation of citizens' fundamental rights. How-
ever, it raised another issue as well: whether the Second Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms is a right 'granted and secured
by the Constitution of the United States, so as to support the
... indictment, and render the offense therein charged cognizable
in [federal] court."'96
The Avery case was certified to the Supreme Court in Decem-
ber 1871. It was argued over two days, March 19 and 20, 1872.91
Chief Justice Chase, who had resumed his place on the Court,
announced the Court's decision the next day in a terse and cryptic
statement: "A majority of the court are of opinion that the case
must be ruled by United States v. Rosenburgh, and the case be
DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION."9 8 However, the
Chief Justice evidently wanted to decide Avery on the merits,
because he disagreed with the majority's decision.9 9 This suggests
96. United States v. Avery, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 251 (1872); KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 129 n.24. The official report of the case differs from
the Lawyer's Edition regarding the questions presented for decision. The Lawyer's Edition
identifies the two questions, whereas the official reporter identifies only the first,
regarding federal jurisdiction to try a case of murder. Compare Avery, 80 U.S. 252, and
Avery, 20 L. Ed. 610.
97. The United States Attorney urged Attorney General Akerman to secure an early
hearing. Letter from D. Corbin to Amos Akerman (Dec. 22, 1871), Series 947, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S PAPERS. Apparently, Akerman complied. Letter from Amos Akerman to D.
Corbin (Jan. 2, 1872), Series M701 (vol. C, at 131), ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAPERS.
98. Avery, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 253 (citing United States v. Rosenburgh, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 580 (1868).
99. The Lawyer's Edition report of Chase's opinion in this case contains a disapproving
sentence that is omitted from the official report: "I am unable to concur in that opinion
[of the majority of the Court], but the case must be dismissed." Avery, 20 L. Ed. at 611
(emphasis in original). The Rosenburgh case, which the majority thought mandated dis-
missal, was decided in 1868. It held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to
decide a motion to quash an indictment certified on a division of opinion whether the
indictment was sufficient "upon a true interpetation of the act under which the indictment
was made." United States v. Rosenburgh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 580. However, Avery presented
a different question, namely, whether Congress constitutionally could confer jurisdiction
upon the federal courts to try criminal offenses, such as murder, and criminal violations
of fundamental rights, such as the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. One
could argue that these questions regarding the court's jurisdiction are different from
those regarding the correct interpretation of a statute to determine if it supports an
indictment and should be decided before the defendants are put through the ordeal and
expense of a criminal trial. Apparently, Chief Justice Chase thought so, since he disagreed
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that he alone on the Court was willing to confront directly the
constitutional issues raised in the Ku Klux Klan prosecutions,
for, as in Blyew, the Court disposed of Avery on technical juris-
dictional grounds.
The Court's dismissal of Avery for want of jurisdiction without
deciding it on the merits reflected a change in policy of the new
attorney general.100 When the case was certified to the Chase
Court in December 1871, United States Attorney, Daniel Corbin,
and United States Attorney General, Amos Akerman, asked the
Court for expedited review, which the Court evidently granted.
However, before the case was argued in March 1872, George
Williams replaced Akerman as Attorney General. In his argu-
ment, Williams urged the Court to do what it did: dismiss for
want of jurisdiction. In contrast to Akerman, Williams manifested
curious indifference to bringing a test case to the Supreme Court.
Just three weeks before they argued Avery in the Supreme Court,
Williams disingenuously asserted in a letter to Senator Reverdy
Johnson that he did not "perceive that the questions presented
in [the Ku Klux Klan trials in South Carolina] are of such pressing
public importance as to require immediate decision." 10 1 Williams
apparently wanted to avoid the risk of the Court eliminating the
Justice Department's authority to pursue its policy of rights
enforcement.
Thus, the Avery case and similar cases involving Klan trials in
the South were politically explosive cases for the Chase Court
to decide, because they directly challenged the constitutionality
of the Justice Department's rights enforcement policies. Regard-
less of how the Court ruled, it could expect fierce condemnation
from substantial portions of the American public. The Court
might slip out of this no-win situation if it had a case that raised
the central constitutional issues in the Klan prosecutions but did
with the result in Avery, according to the Lawyer's Edition. Avery, 20 L.Ed. at 611.
Unfortunately, Chase did not explain why he refused to go along in the latter decision.
It is significant that Chase thought Rosenburgh did not apply to Avery, because he wrote
the opinion in Rosenburgh.
100. It appears that the Justice Department changed its mind about the desirability
of the Supreme Court's resolution of these constitutional questions. Subsequent attempts
to get the Supreme Court to decide the issues raised in the South Carolina Ku Klux
Klan prosecutions also failed despite persistent efforts of defense counsel to get a final
resolution.
101. Letter from George H. Williams to Reverdy Johnson (Feb. 29, 1872), Series M699
(reel 14, vol. I, at 258-59), ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAPERS.
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not involve the political groups and interests in those cases. The
Court heard oral arguments in just such a case just weeks before
it decided Avery and Blyew.
I am referring, of course, to the Slaughter-House Cases. The
petitioners were white butchers who claimed that a state-created
corporate monopoly deprived them of their fundamental rights
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, including
their fundamental right to labor. Consequently, their claims of-
fered the Chase Court the opportunity to interpret these amend-
ments and to determine the extent to which they protected
citizens' fundamental rights. This was the central constitutional
question presented in the Justice Department's prosecution of
the Ku Klux Klan in the federal courts under the 1870 and 1871
statutes.
The facts of the Slaughter-House Cases are straightforward.
The Republican-controlled Louisiana legislature created a slaugh-
terhouse corporation in 1869 and conferred on it the exclusive
privilege of carrying on the business of slaughtering animals for
human consumption. The statute permitted existing butchers and
slaughterhouses to continue their operations, but they had to
remove their businesses to the premises of the corporation and
to pay it a fee for the privilege. This ostensible health measure
applied to three parishes comprising over eleven hundred square
miles and two to three hundred thousand people.102 It put many
butchers out of business. Compounding the perceived injustice
to the unemployed butchers was the fact that the process that
led to its enactment was riddled with blatant corruption, bribery,
graft, and economic self-interest. 10 3 To the butchers and other
members of the affected communities, including the Conservative
Democratic press of New Orleans, this regulation was not a health
and sanitation measure at all. Rather, they saw it as an infamous
example of pork-barrel legislation that conferred monopolistic
privileges on an interest group favored by the corrupt Republi-
can-controlled Louisiana legislature.
Thus, the parties and facts of this case could not be farther
removed from the government's prosecution of Klansmen. More-
over, the Court did not have to interpret the scope of the
102. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 85 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
103. KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 144.
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Reconstruction amendments to decide the Slaughter-House Cases.
Indeed, the majority decided the legal question of the monopoly's
constitutionality without reference to the Reconstruction amend-
ments. Consequently, its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was dicta. When one considers that the Court had disposed
of the typical Klan-type cases on narrow technical grounds with-
out deciding the central constitutional issues they presented, its
decision to do so in Slaughter-House when it did not have to
suggests the Court's case selection was a masterful political
strategy devised by some members of the Chase Court to decide
politically explosive legal questions in a relatively nonpolitical
way. The Court did decide the exceedingly controversial consti-
tutional issues relating to the national enforcement of fundamen-
tal rights in a case that removed the Court from the political
context that made their resolution so urgent and so controversial.
Furthermore, the interests in these cases and their relationship
to the Reconstruction amendments confused the political impact
of the Court's decision. For example, the litigation created a
severe meat shortage in New Orleans, and the aroused public,
already opposed to the Republican party-inspired monopoly,
strongly favored the butchers. 1 4 When the case filed by the
butchers was heard in the federal court at New Orleans, the
newly appointed circuit justice, Joseph P. Bradley, and circuit
judge, William B. Woods, ruled in favor of the butchers. 1 5 In an
opinion written by Justice Bradley, they held that the Fourteenth
Amendment secured the fundamental rights of citizenship, and
concluded that "[Tihere is no more sacred right of [United States]
citizenship than the right to pursue unmolested a lawful employ-
ment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more nor less than the
sacred right of labor."1°6 Characterizing the corporation as an
odius monopoly, Bradley declared, "we feel compelled to decide
104. Id. at 145. The litigation became very complicated as the various parties brought
different suits in different local courts around New Orleans with contradictory decisions.
The butchers also filed an action in the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans.
Charles Fairman ably recounts this history. 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 1320-63 (1971).
105. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C. La. 1870) (No. 8,408) [hereinafter Live-Stock
Dealers].
106. Id. at 652-53.
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that the act in question is a violation of one of the fundamental
privileges of the citizen .... ,"107
Bradley's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment com-
plemented and supported those of the lower court judges who
upheld the constitutionality of the government's civil rights en-
forcement prosecutions.108 It affirmed the broad nationalist theory
of the amendment associated with the Republican party in Con-
gress and with the Department of Justice in the Ku Klux Klan
prosecutions and implicitly rejected the limited view of the
amendment identified as the "Democratic" states rights interpre-
tation of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the Democratic Con-
servative press praised the decision and Bradley's opinion. The
New Orleans Daily Picayune, for example, stated that the decision
dispelled the public's suspicion of these federal judges from the
North. It lauded them for their integrity and impartial adminis-
tration of the law, "for their learning, intelligence, courteous
official manner, and regard for law."'1 9 On the other hand, the
Republican New Orleans Times caustically criticized Bradley and
Woods for stretching federal authority beyond accepted judicial
limits to "a vast and indefinite extension of the power and
authority of the judicial department of the Government."'110 The
reactions of these partisan newspapers would have been just the
reverse if the proponent of the constitutional interpretation the
court adopted had been the government instead of white butch-
ers, and if the government were asserting it in criminal prose-
cutions against Ku Klux Klan defendants rather than a
monopolistic corporation."'
107. Id. at 654.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282);
United States v. Crosby, 25 F. Cas. 701 (C.C.S.C. 1871) (No. 14,893); United States v.
Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324 (C.C. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210 and 15,211). For a discussion of these
and other cases, see KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 1-25.
109. NEw ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE, June 7, 1870, at 4; id., June 8, 1870, at 4; id., June
20, 1870, at 6.
110. 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 104, at 1335-36 (quoting the New Orleans Times).
111. The only New Orleans newspaper that acknowledged the implications of the circuit
court's decision for the federal government's enforcement of the civil rights of black
Americans was the New Orleans Bee. Recognizing its potential importance for the rights
of black Americans, the editor of this black newspaper described Bradley's opinion as
"one of the most luminous expositions of American constitutional law." He compared it
favorably to the opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story: Not
even these great jurists, the editor wrote, "ever uttered grander principles than did
Justice Bradley yesterday." Reprinted in 1 ALB. L.J. 11 (1870).
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The confused relationship of the Slaughter-House Cases to the
politics of civil rights enforcement was reflected in the litigants'
attorneys and the constitutional theories they argued before the
United States Supreme Court. The butchers were represented
by John Archibald Campbell, a former justice of the United
States Supreme Court who resigned his seat when Alabama, his
native state, seceded in 1861. This states rights Southerner
essentially adopted the Republican party's theory of constitution-
alism when he tried to persuade the Supreme Court in February
1872 that the Constitution, as amended by the Reconstruction
amendments, secured the fundamental rights of all citizens and
conferred plenary authority on the national government to en-
force and protect these rights.112 Counsel for the slaughterhouse
corporation included a Republican United States Senator, Mat-
thew Hale Carpenter, and a local Radical Republican, Thomas J.
Durant. Although they did not rebut this theory, their arguments
emphasized state rights, a view associated with the Democratic
party. They argued that the Louisiana statute was a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power.' However the Court decided
this case, the political fallout conceivably could be neutralized
since political partisans favored in the Slaughter-House Cases the
constitutional positions of the opposite side in the Ku Klux Klan
cases.
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Slaughter-
House Cases in January and February of 1872.114 It took the Court
a year to render its decision. By a five-to-four margin, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute and the
corporation it established. Justice Samuel F. Miller spoke for the
five-man majority. It ruled that the Louisiana statute did not
establish an illegal monopoly and did not violate the butchers'
right to labor.1' 5 On the contrary, it was a legitimate and effica-
112. Brief for Appellants, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Democratic
Conservatives who opposed the slaughterhouse as a monopoly created by a corrupt
Republican-controlled state legislature also embraced this theory of the constitution.
KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 146-47.
113. Briefs for Appellees, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
114. The first argument occured in January 1872, but one Justice was absent and the
Justices were divided. The case was reargued before the full Court on February 4, 1872,
just weeks before it heard and decided Avery and two months prior to its decision in
Blyew.
115. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 60-61.
178 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:151
cious exercise of the most important power pertaining to state
government, the power to protect "'the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort, and quiet of all persons, and ... of all property within the
State."' 116 Quoting one of the most eminent state supreme court
justices of his era, Isaac F. Redfield of Vermont, Miller elaborated
the significance of the states' police power:
"[Plersons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. Of the perfect right of the legislature to
do this no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general
principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are con-
cerned." 117
The majority apparently regarded the states' police power as the
most important of all governmental powers, for on this power,
they declared, depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the
comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of
property.118
Moreover, the state's exercise of its police power was constitu-
tional even when it indirectly intruded on the powers delegated
to Congress, such as the commerce power. 119 Expressly affirming
the state's power to charter corporations, even when their char-
ters conferred on them "exclusive privileges- privileges which
it is said constitute a monopoly," 120 the Court concluded that the
Louisiana statute, and the corporation it established, was a le-
gitimate, an appropriate, an effectual, and a constitutional exer-
cise of the state's police power. The emphasis Miller placed on
the police power suggests that the majority's major concern was
its preservation.
116. Id. at 62 (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 139, 149 (1854)).
117. Id. Significantly, the Vermont case from which this statement was quoted involved
the power of the state to regulate railroad corporations chartered by the state, and the
extent to which the state can alter or repeal their charters and impose duties on them
for the protection of the public. This suggests the majority's primary concern in Slaughter-
House: how would their decision affect the police power of the states generally, and this
power relating to the regulation of the slaughtering of animals, a power Miller described
as "among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this [police] power." Id. at 63.
118. Id. at 62.
119. Id. at 63. Miller here cited New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); License
Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1866).
120. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 64.
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Having decided the legal question presented in these cases,
the majority did not have to decide whether the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments secured citizens' fundamental rights,
such as the right to labor. Moreover, it did not matter whether
the right to labor was a constitutionally secured right. Even if
it were, this constitutional guarantee would not have prevented
Louisiana from enacting this scheme of regulating the slaughter-
ing of animals, according to Miller's analysis of the state's police
power.
Yet, Miller went on to interpret the meaning and scope of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. "No questions so far-
reaching and pervading in their consequences ... " Miller opined,
"have been before this court during the offical life of any of its
present members.."121 Although he characterized the Thirteenth
Amendment as a "declaration of the personal freedom of all the
human race,"'122 Miller interpreted its scope narrowly, as a guar-
antee against slavery.123
However, Miller's most important comments were directed to
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. They are well-known
for their effect: the emasculation of its Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Miller interpreted the amendment as recognizing dual
citizenship, state and national, and different bodies of rights that
pertain to each. His conception of the rights of state citizenship
reflected his understanding of the state police power. The rights
of state citizenship are "those rights which are fundamental,"
and they "[embrace] nearly every civil right for the establishment
and protection of which organized government is instituted."'124
Moreover, the states had exclusive jurisdiction over these fun-
damental rights. 125
To preserve the states' police powers, the majority rejected
the theory that United States citizens possessed fundamental
rights as such. For, like the Democratic opponents of civil rights
enforcement, Miller warned that if the Constitution secured fun-
damental rights as rights of United States citizenship, Congress
would have complete legislative authority over these rights. He
121. Id. at 67.
122. Id. at 69.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 76.
125. Id. at 78. States were free to grant or establish whatever rights they chose, and
to limit, qualify, or restrict their exercise free of any interference by the national
government.
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feared that this power would subject the states to the control of
Congress and would destroy local government. 12 6 The majority
refused to accept such a dangerous theory. They concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment leaves to the states the security and
protection of citizens' personal and fundamental rights. The rights
of United States citizenship which the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges or Immunities Clause secures are a few relatively
unimportant rights. 127
Miller's analysis completely ignored the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which conferred substantive civil rights on American citi-
zens, as such, and jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce
them. He could not consider the statute, because it represented
the radical changes in "the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other and of both these governments to the
people" that the majority sought to avoid. 128 Most scholars agree
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood its
first section to be identical in scope and objectives to those of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which they enacted over a presi-
dential veto within weeks of adopting the proposed amendment.12
126. Miller stated:
For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in its
discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that
body may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of
legislative power by the States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in
its judgment it may think proper on all subjects. ... Such a construction ... would
constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the
civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve
as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this
amendment.
Id.
127. Miller identified some of these rights: the right to assemble and to petition the
national government; access to its seaports and navigable waterways, administrative
offices and courts; the protection of the national government when on the high seas and
in foreign lands; the right of interstate travel; the rights secured to American citizens
in foreign treaties: the right to become a citizen of the state of one's residence with the
same rights as other state citizens enjoy. He also included the rights secured by the
other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments. Id. at 79-80. For a novel textual critique of Miller's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause which connects this clause with its equiv-
alent in the Northwest Ordinance, see John J. Gibbons, Intentionalism, History, and
Legitimacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 629-38 (1991).
128. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
129. See, e.g., AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
1193, 1244-46 (1992); Raoul Berger, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-51 (1977); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
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The framers knowingly incorporated the statute into the Four-
teenth Amendment to obviate the possibility of the statute's
repeal by a future Congress and to settle any doubts that might
exist over the statute's constitutionality.180 Drafted and proposed
by the very same session of Congress, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must have been intended by its framers to delegate to
Congress at least as much constitutional authority to secure the
fundamental rights of citizens as they had just exercised in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, especially since one of their purposes
in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure the con-
stitutionality of the statute. Moreover, the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment must have intended the statutory scheme of
rights enforcement they had just enacted with the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 as the minimum scheme of fundamental rights en-
forcement under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has
never resolved conflicting interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
It is understandable, therefore, that opponents of national civil
rights enforcement objected to the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment on essentially the same ground on which they opposed the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. They warned that the amendment would
radically change American federalism by conferring upon Con-
gress the authority to supplant state administration of civil and
criminal justice.18' The Fourteenth Amendment delegated to Con-
gress power that would produce a revolution worse than the
Civil War, opponents complained, because the amendment would
transfer all state authority over citizens' fundamental rights from
the states to the national government, producing irreconciliable
conflicts in federal-state jurisdiction.. They had earlier in the
debates opposed the Civil Rights Bill because it supplanted the
state administration of civil and criminal justice and transferred
authority over citizens' fundamental rights from the states to the
national government. 132 It is significant that supporters acknowl-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 44 (1949); HYMAN & WIECEK, supra
note 5, at 406; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 911; WILLIAM
E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DoC-
TRINE 104 (1988).
130. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 3, at 910-11.
131. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1063-64 (Rep. Hale); id. at 1083-87 (Rep. Davis); id.
at 2500 (Rep. Shanklin); id. at 2538 (Rep. Rogers); id. at 3147 (Rep. Harding); id. at 2987
(Sen. Cowan).
132. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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edged these revolutionary changes in American federalism, al-
though they denied any intention of destroying the states and
absorbing their authority over ordinary civil and criminal proc-
ess.13 3 It is precisely these acknowledged revolutionary changes
in American constitutionalism that the Supreme Court rejected
in the Slaughter-House Cases.134
Having emasculated the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Miller
went on to consider whether the Louisiana statute violated the
butchers' Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal
protection of the law. Miller curtly concluded that it did not. He
disposed of the due process claim with the conclusory assertion
that the Louisiana statute did not deprive the butchers of any
property rights.135 Miller disposed of the equal protection claim
by limiting the Equal Protection Clause to a guarantee against
racially discriminatory state statutes, and virtually only such
statutes that discriminated against blacks.13 6 Completely ignoring
the enforcement of the civil rights statutes of 1870 and 1871 by
the Department of Justice and the federal courts against terror-
ists charged with depriving citizens of their fundamental rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, including their right to the
equal protection of the laws, Miller concluded that the Court
"doubt[s] very much whether any action of a State not directed
by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on
account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview
of this provision. '137 Thus was created the state action interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Chief Justice, along with Justices Bradley and Swayne,
joined a lengthy dissenting opinion written by Justice Field. The
dissenters agreed with the majority that these cases presented
a question "of the gravest importance, not merely to the parties
here, but to the whole country. '1 38 It "is nothing less than ...
whether the recent amendments to the Federal Constitution
133. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 6, at 1065-67 (Rep. Higby); id. at 1066 (Rep. Price); id.
at 2534-35 (Rep. Eckley); id. at 2942 (Sen. Howard); id. at 2961 (Sen. Poland).
134. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
135. Id. at 81.
136. "It is so clearly a provision for [negroes] and that emergency [created by the
Southern black codes], that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any
other," Miller opined. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 89 (Field, J. dissenting).
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protect the citizens of the United States against the deprivation
of their common rights by State legislation.1 3 9 Consistent with
the congressional Republican supporters of civil rights enforce-
ment and the decisions of lower federal court judges, the dis-
senters insisted that the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth
Amendments did afford Americans this protection. Field wrote
that the Thirteenth Amendment was "intended to make every
one born in this country a freeman, and as such to give to him
the right to pursue the ordinary avocations of life ... ,,140 An
individual who did not enjoy the right "to pursue certain callings,"
as others enjoyed, Field reasoned, "certainly would not possess
the liberties nor enjoy the privileges of a freeman." 141 Having
earlier shown that the Louisiana statute created an illegal mo-
nopoly because it conferred on the corporation an exclusive
privilege to exercise an individual right, the "right to pursue one
of the ordinary trades or callings of life,' 142 Field also concluded
139. Id.
140. Id. at 90.
141. Id. Field's discussion of the theory of the Thirteenth Amendment shows that his
interpretation corresponds to that of congressional Republicans in 1866 and of lower
federal court judges prior to Slaughter-House; that is, that the Thirteenth Amendment
secured the rights of free men or citizens. However, his elaboration of the manner in
which the facts of this case fit within the protective guarantees of the Thirteenth
Amendment contain the seeds of Justice Bradley's "badges of servitude" interpretation
of the amendment in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Field's discussion of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 also reflects this ambiguous interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. He explained that the statute conferred citizenship on all Americans and
secured to them enumerated rights "upon the theory that citizens of the United States
as such were entitled to the rights and privileges enumerated," and laws that deny
citizens equality in these rights subjected them to involuntary servitude in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 91. He went on to explain that the Louisiana statute
required every butcher and every person who had animals to sell within three parishes,
an area "exceeding one thousand one hundred square miles, and embaracing over two
hundred thousand people," to go to the slaughterhouse and there carry on their trade or
business and pay it tribute. Id. at 92. These "prohibitions imposed by this act upon
butchers and dealers in cattle" are "odious" "oppressions [which] cannot be applied to a
free man ... except in violation of his rights." Id. at 92-93.
142. Id. at 88-89. Field's lengthy opinion was based on three conclusions of law. First,
the Louisiana statute was not a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. Id. at 88-
89 (Field, J. dissenting). He characterized the health and sanitation objectives of the
statute as a shallow pretence for the grant of "exclusive privileges" to the corporation.
Whereas the state legitimately could restrict slaughterhouses to a specific area outside
urban centers in the interests of health and sanitation, it could not legitimately or
constitutionally confer an exclusive "right to pursue one of the ordinary trades or callings
of life, which is a right appertaining soley to the individual." He insisted that, if the
exclusive privileges in this case were constitutional, "there is no monopoly, in the most
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that the statute was unconstitutional because it deprived the
butchers of this fundamental right which is secured by the
Thirteenth Amendment.
However, Field did not base his objections to the Louisiana
statute on the Thirteenth Amendment because, in his opinion,
the Fourteenth Amendment covered the case. Field forcefully
concluded that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment
which was "intended by the Congress which framed it and the
States which adopted it" to "protect the citizens of the United
States against the deprivation of their common rights by State
legislation."'143 The critical predicate of Field's understanding of
the amendment was the nature of United States citizenship which
it conferred. "A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the
United States residing in that State.' 1 44 It is by virtue of his
United States citizenship conferred by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Field reasoned, that he now possesses and enjoys the
fundamental rights of free men. "[T]he fundamental rights, priv-
ileges, and immunities which belong to [the individual] as a free
man and a free citizen," Field declared, "now belong to him as a
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his
citizenship of any State."'45 Field explained that "They do not
derive their existence from [state] legislation, and cannot be
destroyed by its power. 4 6 Although he recognized concurrent
odious form, which may not be upheld." Field thus distinguished exclusive grants for
ferries, bridges, and turnpikes whose franchises are of a public character "appertaining
to government," and are legitimate. Id. at 88 (Field, J. dissenting).
This conclusion leads to the second: the statute created an illegal monopoly. Reasoning
from English history, English common law, and recent American judicial authorities,
Field asserted that all exclusive privileges conferred by government on an individual or
a corporation to engage in any lawful trade or business were monopolies and void as
restraints on freedom and liberty. Because the Louisiana statute conferred on the
corporation the exclusive privilege to carry on the slaughterhouse business it restrained
the butcher's freedom and liberty. Id. at 84-89 (Field, J. dissenting).
This conclusion leads directly to Field's third: that this illegal monopoly was also
unconstitutional because it infringes constitutionally secured rights of American citizens.
It is this aspect of Field's opinion that I analyze in the text.
143. Id. at 89 (Field, J. dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95-96 (Field, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 95 (Field, J. dissenting). Field's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
echoed the views of its Congressional framers. Field took his definition of the privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship from the very authority that Miller cited in
defining the rights of state citizenship: Justice Bushrod Washington's circuit court opinion
in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.N.J. 1823) (No. 3,230). Field declared that they
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state jurisdiction over citizen's fundamental rights, Field con-
cluded that "[t]he fourteenth amendment [sic] places them under
the guardianship of the National authority." 147 Field characterized
the right to labor as "one of the most sacred and imprescriptible
rights of man ... .,"148 Therefore, the Louisiana statute which
conferred on the corporation the exclusive privilege to carry on
the slaughterhouse business restrained the butchers' freedom
"are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free governments." Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J. dissenting). He thus characterized the Fourteenth
Amendment as "intended to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable
rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but only
recognizes." Id. at 105 (Field, J. dissenting). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment places
these rights under the protection of the national government. This interpretation of
Field's dissent parallels those of Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence
of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism,
1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975); and HAMILTON, THE PATH OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 167 (C. Read ed., rev. ed. 1968). It is on this critical
point that this analysis of Field's dissent differs from that of William Nelson. Nelson
characterizes Field's conception of the Fourteenth Amendment's protective guarantees
as "narrow because it held that not all rights, but only fundamental rights, such as the
right to engage in the common occupations, are within the ambit of section one and thus
subject to federal judicial control." NELSON, supra note 128, at 158. Nelson then reduces
this "narrow" protection even further to "only one right against governmental infringe-
ment-the right to equality." Id. at 161. This analysis disagrees with Nelson's because,
according to Field's analysis, a citizen possessed fundamental rights independent of the
states because they "now belong to him as a citizen of the United States." Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95 (Field, J. dissenting). Field made this point explicitly
when he declared that these fundamental rights "do not derive their existence from
[state] legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its power." Id. at 95-96. For Field, as for
Bradley and Swayne, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments secured the rights
themselves, not merely a right to equal protection. Therefore, under Field's analysis a
state could not abolish its citizens' right to pursue a common calling because this right
was secured to them under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Moreover, this
theory of constitutionally secured rights enlarged Congress' authority over the states'
police power, because Congress could virtually supplant the states in their regulation of
citizens' personal rights since they were rights of United States citizenship as such.
Consequently, this analysis also disagrees with Nelson's conclusion that Bradley's and
Swayne's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment differed significantly from Field's.
147. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 101 (Field, J. dissenting).
Field observed that the exercise and enjoyment of these fundamental rights "are
always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of the State, or
city, or town where [the citizen] resides." Id. at 95. Although the state may regulate all
such pursuits, professions, and avocations in the interest of health, order, and prosperity,
"the pursuit or calling must be free to be followed by every citizen who is within the
conditions designated, and will conform to the regulations." Id. at 110.
148. Id. Quoting Justice Bradley's circuit court opinion with approval, Field asserted
that "'There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue unmolested
a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing more nor less than the sacred
right of labor."' Id. at 106 (Field, J. dissenting) (quoting Live-Stock Dealers, 15 F. Cas.
649, 652 (C.C. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
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and liberty and violated their constitutionally-secured right to
labor.
Although Bradley joined Field's opinion, he added one of his
own, analyzing the case essentially in the same way that Field
did. 149 Bradley's opinion is noteworthy because of its attack on
the majority opinion's failure to interpret the Reconstruction
amendments within their historical context. The majority's views
of citizenship and citizens' rights "evince a very narrow and
insufficient estimate of constitutional history and the rights of
men," Bradley complained. 15 Referring to Klan terrorism with
which, as circuit justice for Southern states, he was well ac-
quainted, Bradley admonished, "We shall be a happier nation,
and a more prosperous one than we now are, when the spirit of
lawlessness, mob violence, and sectional hate can be so completely
repressed as to give full practical effect to" the rights of United
States citizenship. 151
Swayne's dissent emphasized the revolutionary nature of the
Reconstruction amendments. They are nothing less than "a new
149. Bradley's analysis differed from Field's in one essential respect: the meaning of
the Comity Clause and citizens' rights before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whereas Field expressed the view that the privileges and immunities secured by the
Comity Clause were rights of state citizenship and that the Comity Clause guaranteed
to citizens of other states an equality in those rights which the state extended to its
own citizens, Bradley understood these rights to be the fundamental rights of citizenship
which the individual possessed both as a United States citizen and as a citizen of the
state of his residence. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 121 (Bradley, J.
dissenting). But Bradley and Field expressed the same understanding of the nature of
citizenship and citizens' rights which the Fourteenth Amendment defined and secured.
However, Bradley also made more explicit how the monopoly violated the butchers'
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to liberty and property and their Fourteenth
Amendment right to the equal protection of the laws. He also addressed the fears Miller
expressed regarding the effects this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have on Congress' power to interfere with the internal affairs of the states and the
expanded dockets of the federal courts. Disagreeing with the majority as to the serious-
ness of these problems, Bradley declared:
The great question is, What is the true construction of the amendment? When
once we find that, we shall find the means of giving it effect. The argument from
inconvenience ought not to have a very controlling influence in questions of this
sort. The National will and National interest are of far greater importance.
Id. at 124.
150. Id. at 113 (Bradley, J. dissenting).
151. Id. Bradley also characterized the Louisiana statute as "one of those arbitrary
and unjust laws made in the interest of a few scheming individuals, by which some of
the Southern States have, within the past few years, been so deplorably oppressed and
impoverished." Id. at 120. He added, "It seems to me strange that it can be viewed in
any other light." Id.
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Magna Charta," Swayne declared, for they secure to every person
within the United States the fundamental rights to life, liberty,
and property, which include the right to labor.152 Reflecting the
nationalizing impact of the period, Swayne declared that "[Wyithout
such authority any government claiming to be national is glar-
ingly defective." 10 Moreover, Swayne insisted that the framers
of these amendments intended to confer this power on the na-
tional government.5
In what today seems ironic, Swayne admonished the majority
for taking liberties with their construction of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, a criticism levied in recent years by
narrow-construction originalists against liberals who seek to in-
terpret the Fourteenth Amendment in broad ways to reach liberal
results. Swayne invoked what today we would characterize as an
originalist and narrow-constructionist argument on behalf of a
broad construction of constitutionally-secured rights in opposition
to the majority's narrow construction, an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment that many today would characterize as
nonoriginalist and noninterpretavist.155 Swayne chided the major-
ity that "[T]his court has no authority to interpolate a limitation
that is neither expressed nor implied. Our duty is to execute the
law, not to make it."' 1
Swayne added some ominous remarks that reflected his expe-
rience as circuit justice for Kentucky and other states that were
plagued with Ku Klux Klan-type terrorism. He repeated the need
for national guarantees against oppression. "But this arm of our
jurisdiction," Swayne lamented, "is, in these cases, stricken down
by the judgment just given."1 57 Acknowledging the dissenters'
fears concerning the impact of the Court's decision on the affairs
of the Southern states, he concluded: "I earnestly hope that the
152. Id. at 125 (Swayne, J. dissenting).
153. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J. dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Nonorginalism is fairly self-explanatory. "Noninterpretavism" is a counterintuitive,
technical term that constitutional theorists use to describe that view of constitutional
interpretation that is not limited to the text or to the intent and understanding of the
framers. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204 (1980); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
156. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J. dissenting).
157. Id.
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consequences to follow may prove less serious and far-reaching
than the minority fear they will be."'1
The statements made in the majority and dissenting opinions
strongly suggest that the justices understood that the Court's
decision in the Slaughter-House Cases emasculated the power of
the national government to protect and enforce the fundamental
rights of United States citizens against terrorism in the South.159
Miller blamed his opinion and the intrigue of Bradley and Swayne
for being passed over to replace Chase as chief justice. 6 °
To a limited extent, the press recognized the consequences of
the Slaughter-House decision for the administration's civil rights
enforcement policies. The Chicago Tribune called the decision a
needed check "upon the determination of the Adminsitration to
enforce its policy and to maintain its power, even at the expense
of the constitutional prerogatives of the States."'161 The New York
World speculated that the Court was restrained in its decision
because of "their consciousness that they were running counter
to the impetuous hostility of the Republican Party to the consti-
tutional rights of the States."'162 The editor of the American Law
Review satirized the decision's impact upon Grant's Southern
policy with the observation,
that, while the executive department keeps Casey in New Orleans,
and sends its soldiers to regulate the internal politics of Louisiana,
the judicial department remits to the people of the State, to its
158. Id. at 130 (Swayne, -J. dissenting).
159. I am referring here not only to Swayne's comments quoted in the text, but also
to Miller's characterization of the questions before the Court, the references Bradley and
Swayne made to conditions in the South that accounted for the framing and ratification
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the nature of the interpretations and
analyses these dissenters expressed which tracked so closely opinions they wrote as
circuit justices, and the fifteen months it took for the Court to decide the case.
160. Letter from Justice Sam. F. Miller to Justice David Davis (Sept. 7, 1873) (file 110),
DAVID DAVIS PAPERS, Chicago Historical Society. This "will not be the first time that the
best and most beneficial public act of a man's life has stood in the way of his political
advancement," Miller wrote to Davis. He complained that the position of chief justice
had "always been the reward of political, I may say [sic] partisan services." Disclaiming
partisanship in the Slaughter-House Cases, Miller condescendingly suggested that "it is
perhaps looking for too much to expect Grant with these examples before him, to look
alone to the voice of the profession or to the qualifications of the nominee."
161. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 544 (1937)
(quoting the Chicago Tribune).
162. Id. at 545 (quoting the New York World).
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courts and legislature, the custody of the privileges and immunities
of its citizens. 163
However, press reaction to Slaughter-House generally did not
discuss its impact on President Grant's Southern policy. 164 News-
paper commentary supports the view of contemporaneous con-
stitutional expert, M. F. Taylor, that the public did not fully
understand the import of the decision in. this regard.165 Thus, the
Court's apparent strategy of interpreting the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in a politically neutral case to avoid strong political reaction,
if not retaliation, seems to have worked.
Moreover, by 1873, the people of the Northern states had
shifted their attention from Reconstruction to the problems as-
sociated with industrialization and urbanization. Even many who
had earlier supported the cause of civil rights desired an end to
Reconstruction in order to grapple more effectively with the
problems of economic development, particularly the need to reg-
ulate growing concentrations of economic power by business
entities that were acquiring monopolistic and oligopolistic control
of markets. For example, the Chicago Tribune, an avid supporter
of civil rights protection in 1866, strongly supported the majori-
ty's decision in Slaughter-House, because it understood the deci-
sion as a vindication of the states' power to control monopolies.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's sanction of state-conferred special
privileges to process meat for human consumption in Louisiana
implicitly affirmed the states' power to regulate monopolies in
Northern states such as Illinois. 166 The Nation, having earlier
expressed fears regarding the Slaughter-House Case's impact upon
the viability of private franchises, such as railroads, canals, and
patents, hailed the Supreme Court's decision as preserving "al-
163. 7 AM. L. REV. 732 (1873). The "Casey" to whom the editor referred was James F.
Casey, President Grant's brother-in-law, who was serving as the Collector of the Port of
New Orleans and was associated with the Kellogg-Packard wing of the Republican party
in Louisiana at the time Slaughter-House was decided.
164. For newspaper reaction, see KACZOROWSKI, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
2, at 170 n.58.
165. M. F. Taylor, The Slaughterhouse Cases, 3 So. L. REV. 476, 477 (1874).
166. CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1873. For the Tribune's editorial policies regarding civil rights
enforcement in 1866, see, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1866, at 2; id., Jan. 17, 1866, at 2; id., Feb.
5, 1866, at 2; id., Apr. 30, 1866, at 2; id., May 1, 1866, at 2; id., May 19, 1866, at 2; id.,
May 31, 1866, at 2; id., June 6, 1866.
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most every franchise in the United States" and vindicating the
states' power to charter corporations. 16 7 The primary contempo-
raneous importance of Slaughter-House, then, was not that it
curtailed national civil rights enforcement authority. Rather, it
was that the Court affirmed the state's police power.
Many of the North's spokesmen and leaders chose to revivify
state rights at the expense of national enforcement of citizens'
rights.168 For example, like the Chicago Tribune, The Nation in
1866 had been a strong supporter of national civil rights enforce-
ment.16 9 Again like the Chicago Tribune, in 1873 it condemned
the butchers' interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
bringing citizens' civil rights within the protection of the national
government. This "monstrous conclusion," the editor admonished,
"would put an end to federal government, do away with state
courts, laws and constitutions, and throw pretty much the entire
business of the country into the hands of Congress and the
officials of the United States."' 170 He congratulated the Supreme
Court for "recovering from the War fever, and ... [for] aban-
don[ing] sentimental canons of [constitutional] construction. 171
Apparently, a majority of the Chase Court made the same
choice in the Slaughter-House Cases. Their decision, however,
represents one of the most blatant examples of judicial legislation
in the Court's history. It was also one of the most important
decisions in the Court's history, for it nullified a revolution in
American constitutionalism that the congressional framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended, and the Department of Justice
and federal courts implemented, to enforce citizens' fundamental
rights involving Bill of Rights guarantees. The consequences of
these choices were a series of decisions through the remainder
of the nineteenth century that further curtailed the constitutional
and statutory authority of the national government to enforce
167. 16 THE NATION 280 (Apr. 24, 1873). See also, 11 id. 361 (Dec. 1, 1870).
168. KACZOROWSK], JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 159-66.
169. 1 THE NATION 711 (Dec. 7, 1865); 2 id. 262 (Mar. 1, 1866); 2 id. 122 (Apr. 5, 1866);
2 id. 744 (June 12, 1866).
170. 16 id. 280 (Apr. 24, 1873).
171. Id. Commenting approvingly that the majority's decision was a desperately needed
check on the centralization of power in the national government which cut deeply into
the power of the states, the Chicago Tribune's editor happily reported that the decision
held that the national government "had no power to interfere with municipal relations,
however unjust in themselves, or with previously-existing states rights." CHI. TRIB., Apr.
19, 1873, at 4.
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citizens' rights.172 The end result was the legalization of American
apartheid.
One wonders, though, what this history would have been if
Chief Justice Chase had retained some of his earlier vigor. Would
the result have been different? Would he have been able to
persuade one justice to transform the dissenters into the major-
ity? He may very well have succeeded. Just weeks before the
Court announced its decision in Slaughter-House, Justice William
Strong issued an opinion as circuit justice for Delaware in which
he, and the district court judge, Edward Bradford, ruled that the
Reconstruction amendments affirmatively secured the fundamen-
tal rights of citizens.173 Strong's opinion in this circuit court case
would have placed him with the dissenters in Slaughter-House.
We do not know how and why he changed his understanding of
the Reconstruction amendments. Had a healthy Chase been able
to hold him with the dissenters, American legal and constitutional
history very likely would have been very different.
172. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1874); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1875); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court did not completely eliminate
the national government's power to enforce citizens' rights. See, Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1880); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351 (1886); Ex parte Logan, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
However, it described that role by defining the national government's power to enforce
citizens' rights as limited to racially discriminatory state action. See, e.g., Cruikshank,
Reese, and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
173. United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1325, 1326, 1328-29 (C.C. Del. 1873) (No. 15,211).

